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INTRODUCTION 
¶1 The Special Court of Sierra Leone (“SCSL”) was established, pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 1315, as an international body in its own right charged with the mandate of 
prosecuting persons who bear the “[g]reatest responsibility for the commission of serious 
violations of international humanitarian law and crimes committed under Sierra Leonean law 
since the outbreak of a brutal civil war in Sierra Leone in November 1996.” To date, this 
mandate has been fulfilled but for one trial - the Charles Taylor case.1 
¶2 The SCSL estimates that a judgment in the Taylor case shall be delivered by February 
2012. With this in mind, the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight (“OIOS”) conducted an 
audit of the SCSL as the court prepared to transform into a Residual Special Court (“RSC”). 
Some of the key recommendations of the audit included that: 
¶3 The SCSL registrar should establish a mechanism for ranking staff to be downsized or 
retained. 
¶4 The SCSL registrar should ensure that consistency is achieved between staff performance 
and the ratings in their e-PAS reports. 
¶5 Each case regarding staff retrenchment/retention should be considered carefully and be 
fully documented. 
¶6 Aside from the completion strategy and preparations for transitioning towards an RSC, one 
theme appeared dominant in the SCSL: both the Charles Taylor and Brima, Kamara and Kanu 
Appeals Chambers dealt with numerous contempt issues.  
¶7 One of the most significant developments at the SCSL in 2011 was the indictment of five 
adult male persons on a charge of contempt of court. All five were former members of the 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (“AFRC”). One of the Accused, Samuel Kargbo, aka 
Sammy Ragga (“Ragga”), pled guilty. Three of the five accused of contempt are convicts of the 
Tribunal who were serving their time in Rwanda: Alex Tamba Brima (aka "Gullit”), Ibrahim Bazzy 
Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu (aka "Five-Five"). The fifth man is a former member of the AFR 
known as Hassan Papa Bangura (aka “Bomblast”). All these men were charged with contempt of 
court for attempts to contact witnesses for the purpose of having them recant their testimony with 
the hope that the convictions against them might be overturned, thus contravening Rule 77 of the 
SCSL Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
                                                 
1
 SCSL, Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, SCSL-03-01, http://www.sc-sl.org/CASES/Prosecutorvs 
CharlesTaylor/tabid/107/Default.aspx. 




¶8 This memo provides a brief background and overview of the Court and what has been 
accomplished thus far. The second section gives an overview of the key sections of SCSL cases 
and significant developments therein. The final section of this memo briefly summarizes some of 
the procedural developments in the Charles Taylor case. This overview will also address the 
issue of contempt in court.  
BACKGROUND 
¶9 The cases at the SCSL can be split into four broad categories. For purposes of this memo, 
we shall not examine each subgroup in detail since most have already concluded or did not have 
any key legal developments in 2011. The cases are broadly split as follows:  
 The Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa, Civil Defense Forces2 
 The Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor 
 The Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, Revolutionary United Front3 
 The Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council4 
¶10 The named defendants were the key actors in the long, bloody and protracted civil war in 
Sierra Leone that waged from 1991 to 2000. 
¶11 Most of the accused persons in this court have already been found guilty and sentenced. The case 
of The Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Ibrahim Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu concluded 
with the Appeal Judgment on February 22, 2008. The Appeals Chamber upheld sentences of 50 years for 
Brima, 45 years for Kamara, and 50 years for Kanu. These men are now currently serving out their 
sentences in Mpanga Prison, Nyanza, Rwanda.  
¶12 In the cases of The Prosecutor v. Foday Saybana Sankoh,5 Sam Bockarie, Issa Hassan Sesay and 
Morris Kallon, the defendants were indicted on March 7, 2003. Augustine Gbao was indicted on April 16, 
2003. There are similarly no new developments in Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa. In short, the CDF 
cases have been concluded. In many respects these prosecutions bring the RUF, AFRC and CDF cases to 
a close.  
KEY LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS AT THE SCSL IN 2011 
¶13 Only two cases at the SCSL had noteworthy developments: The Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba 
Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Kanu and The Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor. 
¶14 On January 10, 2011, the President dismissed a motion by the Office of the Prosecutor 
directing the Registrar of the Court to appoint an independent investigator to “[i]nvestigate an 
allegation of contempt pursuant to Rule 77(C)(iii) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the 
Special Court of Sierra Leone (‘Rules’).” The Honorable Judge Kamanda—President of the 
SCSL—ruled that he had no authority to hear the matter, stating that the matter could not fall 
                                                 
2
 SCSL, Prosecutor v. Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, SCSL-04-14, http://www.sc-sl.org/CASES/ 
Prosecutorvs FofanaandKondewaCDFCase/tabid/104/Default.aspx. 
3
 SCSL, Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon, and Augustine Gbao, SCSL-04-15, http://www.sc-
sl.org/CASES/ProsecutorvsSesayKallonandGbaoRUFCase/tabid/105/Default.aspx. 
4
 SCSL, Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Ibrahim Bazzy Kamara, and Santigie Borbor Kanu, SCSL-04-16, 
http://www.sc-sl.org/CASES/Prosecutor vsBrimaKamaraandKanuAFRCCase/tabid/106/Default.aspx. 
5
 SCSL, Prosecutor v. Froday Saybana Sankoh, SCSL-03-02, http://www.sc-sl.org/CASES/FodaySankoh 
/tabid/187/Default.aspx. 




within his jurisdiction based solely on the fact that he was the Judge President (“JP”). The JP 
proceeded to lay down the law as presented by Rule 77 of the Rules of the Court. He argued that 
Rule 77 set out in a coherent, careful and chronological order “[t]he procedure at every stage 
from the time the allegation is made, to the final appeal against conviction or acquittal.” He 
further explained Rule 77(c)(i) to stipulate that the contempt matter ought to be heard by a panel 
of three judges. Consequently he held that the matter was improper and as such he could not 
entertain the Motion, which was in turn dismissed in its entirety. 
¶15 The Prosecution then brought an Urgent Prosecution Motion for an Investigation into 
Contempt of the SCSL before the Trial Chamber II, which handed down its decision on March 
18, 2011. This decision did not deal with actual contempt or whether there had been a violation 
of Rule 77, but rather whether an independent investigator ought to be appointed to determine if 
indeed there was contempt after which the necessary indictments could be issued against the 
necessary parties. 
¶16 In order to resolve the contempt issue, the Trial Chamber had to determine if there had 
been interference with a witness in the Brima, Kamara and Kanu case. The Prosecution alleged 
that Samuel Kargbo, a former AFRC member, contacted at least one Prosecution witness (TF1-
334) in an attempt to get the witness to recant his testimony in exchange for some money. The 
Prosecution alleged this to be in a violation of Rule 77(A) and Rule 77(B), and thus in 
contravention of the SCSL. It was also alleged that Hassan Papa Bangura, a former AFRC 
member, was involved in the scheme to commit contempt of court as well. 
¶17 The key issue was whether there had in fact been interference with a witness in 
contravention of the Rules of the Court. The second issue was whether the alleged interference 
should result in denial of telephone and other similar privileges conferred on the incarcerated 
persons. The Trial Chamber followed a previous ruling of the ICTY in the Brdjanin decision, 
which held that “intimidation of a witness as contempt of court is a crime of conduct, which does 
not require proof of a result. Whether the witness was actually intimidated is immaterial; the 
Prosecution need only prove that the conduct in question was intended to interfere with the 
Tribunal’s due administration of justice.” Using this as their point of departure, the Trial 
Chamber found that there was likelihood of contempt of court. The Trial Chamber ruled that a 
special investigator be appointed to conduct an investigation and submit his/her findings to the 
Register of the Court. With regards to the second issue, the Trial Chamber held that due to 
insufficient evidence, telephone privileges could not be withdrawn but privileges could be 
closely monitored to prevent abuse, as was already being done. 
¶18 In addition, the Trial Chamber ruled that despite the fact that there was no evidence of any 
money changing hands, the mere offer of a bribe to get a witness to recant a previous testimony 
constituted contempt of court and a violation of Rule 77(a)(iv). 
¶19 Although the findings with regards to Bangura, Brima, Kamara, and Kanu were not 
disclosed, it would appear that the appointed independent counsel did find sufficient grounds to 
conclude there had been an attempt to bribe a witness and to recommend initiation of 
proceedings against the Accused and convicted persons. On June 7, 2011, the Court issued a 
press release that it was indicting five men for contempt borne out of interference and attempted 
interference with witnesses. The release stated that: 
¶20 Two convicted former leaders of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, Ibrahim Bazzy 
Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu (AKA: “Five-Five”), were given the indictment at Rwanda’s 
Mpanga Prison, where they are serving lengthy sentences for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.  




¶21 Charged with Kamara and Kanu are Hassan Papa Bangura (AKA: “Bomblast”) and 
Samuel Kargbo (AKA “Sammy Ragga”), resident in Sierra Leone. All four are charged with two 
counts of attempting to bribe a witness to recant his previous testimony.  
¶22 Kamara faces an additional count of disclosing the name of a protected witness, “in 
knowing violation of an order of a Chamber.” 
¶23 Another press release on July 15, 2011 stated that Samuel Kargbo had pled guilty to the 
charge of contravening Rule 77 of the SCSL Rules of Procedure by attempting to contact 
witnesses for the sole purpose of having them recant their testimony with the hope that the 
convictions against him might be overturned. His sentencing was held over until after the Court 
heard the matter on the same issue for the other four accused persons. The ruling on the matter is 
yet to be delivered. 
A. Developments in the Charles Ghankay Taylor Case 
1. Trial Chamber Decisions 
¶24 On January 12, 2011, the Defense filed a motion for a stay of proceedings, to either vacate 
the deadline for filing the parties’ final brief or alternatively, to obtain a one-month extension for 
filing the brief. The motion was dismissed. The Trial Chamber found that since the Prosecution 
did not file a response to the request or the motion, given the urgency of the request and the lack 
of prejudice to the Prosecution, it was appropriate to render a decision without a submission from 
the Prosecution. 
¶25 On January 27, 2011, the Defense filed a motion to re-open its case for the purpose of 
seeking admission of documents (information from the government of the United States (“USG”) 
leaked by WikiLeaks, which were published in The Guardian on December 17, 2010) on the 
basis that the evidence could not have been obtained and presented during its case-in-chief. 
Additionally, the Defense argued that the documents were of special significance and had 
probative value given that they raised doubt about the independence and impartiality of the 
Special Court’s prosecution. The Trial Chamber admitted the documents in part. 
¶26 The Defense argued that pursuant to Rule 92bis, the documents were admissible on the 
basis that they supported the proposition that the prosecution of Mr. Taylor was political. This 
proposition was supported in part by allegations that his indictment was selective, and that the 
information contained in the USG cables was factual—according to the United States diplomatic 
personnel—and not opinion-based. The Prosecution opposed the motion on the ground that the 
Defense failed to demonstrate the relevance of the documents. The Trial Chamber only admitted 
the USG cable dated March 10, 2009 and the USG cable from April 15, 2009. The remainder of 
the motion was dismissed. 
¶27 On January 28, 2011, the Defense filed a motion for disclosure and/or investigation of the 
USG sources within the Trial Chamber, the Prosecution and the Registry, based on the leaked 
USG Cables. The Trial Chamber found that the Defense did not show any evidence that there 
had been interference with the independence and impartiality of the Court. Therefore, there was 
no basis for either disclosure or an investigation. The motion was dismissed. 
¶28 The Defense requested that the identity of the source(s) be disclosed within the Trial 
Chamber, the Prosecution, and the Registry as to who provided the USG with the information in 
the cables. The Defense also requested disclosure or an investigation with regards to the nature 
of the sources with the USG; the possibility that the Prosecution had sought or received 
instructions from the USG regarding any aspect of the Taylor trial; and an explanation of the 




money provided by the USG to the Prosecution, including the amount of money given and when, 
the purpose of the funds, their use, and who the Prosecution was accountable to in the 
distribution and use of the funds. The Defense argued that the USG cables and a specific 
newspaper article clearly indicated the desire of the USG to ensure that Mr. Taylor did not return 
to Liberia, and such evidence proved that there were and had been contacts between the Trial 
Chamber, the Prosecutor and the Registry, and agents of the USG outside the official lines of 
communications. According to the Defense, an investigation and/or disclosure of the identity of 
the sources was the only way to remove doubts about the independence and impartiality of the 
Tribunals. 
¶29 The Prosecution opposed the motion and submitted that it should be dismissed on the basis 
that it was “untimely and frivolous” and it only appeared to be an attempt to delay the 
proceedings. The evidence of cooperation between the Prosecution and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) or the USG, without proof that the Prosecution received instructions from the 
USG, did not per se mean that the Prosecution lacked independence as a separate organ of the 
Special Court, nor that it sought or received instructions from any Government or any other 
source.  
¶30 The Trial Chamber found that although it was of concern to the Trial Chamber that the 
USG may have received information from “contacts” in the Chambers, the Registry or the 
Prosecution, the second USG cable did not demonstrate an actual threat of interference with the 
independence and impartiality of the Court or any of its organs. The cables only evidenced the 
Court’s impartiality and independence. 
¶31  On March 24, 2011, the Trial Chamber decided, with confidential annexes, a motion to 
summarily deal with contempt and urgent interim measures. The Trial Chamber granted the 
motion in part. The Defense filed its “Confidential with Annexes A-C Defence Final Brief” on 
February 3, 2011, which was not accepted by the Trial Chamber due to its late filing. As a result, 
the Defense filed a “Public with Annex A and Confidential Annex B Corrigendum to Defence 
Final Brief (Corrigendum).” On February 14, 2011, the Chief of Prosecution contacted the Court 
Management Section (“CMS”) to express concern that the names of seven protected witnesses 
were disclosed in the Public Annex A. Subsequently, the Chief of Prosecution requested the 
CMS take immediate action to ensure there was no longer any public access to the pages of the 
document. The Trial Chamber issued an interim order to CMS to re-classify Annex A of the 
Corrigendum as Confidential pending the Trial Chamber’s decision on the Motion. 
¶32 In the motion, the Prosecution argued that pursuant to article 4(B) of the Practice Direction 
on Filing Documents Before the Special Court for Sierra Leone, only public documents may be 
disseminated publicly while confidential documents retain confidentiality until they are viewed 
by the Trial Chamber. The dissemination of a portion of the Confidential Final Trial Brief 
demonstrated that the Defense Counsel acted with a reckless indifference to court orders, rules 
and directives. The Prosecution argued that there was reason to believe that the Defense Counsel 
knowingly and willfully, with indifference for court-ordered protective measures, disclosed the 
identity of seven protected Prosecution witnesses. It further requested to the Trial Chamber to 
order interim measures so that the Annex A of the Corrigendum be classified as confidential.  
¶33 The Defense apologized and argued that they should not be subject to disciplinary action 
or contempt proceedings, as the disclosure was an “unintentional mistake.” The Trial Chamber 
noted that even though the submissions of the Parties were filed confidentially, nothing in the 
decision identified protected witnesses. Therefore, the decision was filed publicly. The Trial 
Chamber granted the motion in part and deferred its decision on the merits of the motion until 




the trial was completed. The Trial Chamber also ordered the CMS to reclassify Annex A of the 
Corrigendum as confidential, to notify all the persons who received Annex A that it had been re-
classified as confidential, and to inform necessary individuals that they should refrain from any 
distribution of the document until the pertinent proceedings occurred. The Trial Chamber also 
dismissed any other interim measure requested by the Prosecution.  
¶34 Justice Julia Sebutinde partially dissented and stated that although the Special Court had 
handled many allegations of contempt pursuant to Rule 77, this as the first time in its history that 
the Trial Chamber has been asked to summarily handle a contempt proceeding arising out of its 
own proceedings, rather than referring the investigation to independent counsel. Alternatively, 
Rule 77 lists examples of contemptuous conduct proscribed as offenses within the jurisdiction of 
the Special Court, rather than defining the offense of “contempt” or “offences against the 
administration of justice.” Not every example of misconduct in the investigation or conduct of a 
case amounts to contempt. The Prosecutor must detail why the alleged conduct would amount to 
contempt. Such contempt should reach a sufficient level of seriousness. Rule 77(C) enshrines 
two separate standards of proof. The first standard to be applied by the Trial Chamber as a 
preliminary inquiry into an allegation of contempt is one of reasonable belief that a person may 
be in contempt of court. The second standard is one of “proof beyond reasonable doubt” that a 
person did commit contempt. In this case, the Prosecution would have the burden to prove the 
offense met the two standards. Only when the Prosecution has met this standard should the Trial 
Chamber proceed to summarily try the individual or entity allegedly in contempt of court. At 
trial, the Trial Chamber would have to satisfy beyond a reasonable doubt that Defense Counsel 
did in fact commit contempt, before finding him guilty as charged.  
¶35 Justice Sebutinde proposed an examination of the merits of the motion. Additionally, she 
agreed that there was no doubt that the publication of the names of protected witnesses was a 
serious violation of the Trial Chamber’s orders that had the potential to endanger the security of 
the concerned witnesses and/or their families. Justice Sebutinde also weighed the apology by the 
Defense and the timely action taken by the Prosecution to make the controversial information 
confidential in considering whether or not sanctions were instantly necessary. In Justice 
Sebutinde’s view, the conduct could not be described as “calculated to obstruct the court’s task 
of getting at the truth” nor “a knowing and willful interference in the administration of justice.” 
Regarding the publication of Public Annex A, the Prosecution did not demonstrate “reason to 
believe” that lead Defense Counsel had committed contempt or that such action was “calculated 
to obstruct the court’s task of getting at the truth.” According to the Justice’s view, there was no 
merit in the Prosecution’s allegations of contempt or misconduct on the part of lead Defense 
Counsel, and thus the Justice would dismiss the motion in its entirety, save for the interim 
measures granted by the Trial Chamber. 
CONCLUSION 
¶36 Very few key legal developments occurred at the SCSL in 2011. Ground covered by the 
SCSL was mostly focused on issues of contempt of court matters. It would therefore appear that 
this is a growing concern for the SCSL and its fight against impunity. As the SCSL transforms 
into a Residual Special Court, it is likely that cases similar to the ones reviewed will increase and 
therefore expand this field of international criminal law jurisprudence. 




 CASES STILL PENDING AT THE SCSL 
 The Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara, Kanu and Bangura contempt of court 
case. 
 The Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor trial judgment. 
